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ABSTRACT 
 
Research indicates that gamblers frequently set self-imposed limits on 
how much time and money they wish to gamble in a given gambling session, 
yet consistently gamble more than initially intended. The emotional and 
arousing impact of gambling, as well as dissociative states gamblers 
experience whilst gambling, may contribute to this behavioural shift which 
reflects a failure in self-control. Essential then, is the need for harm 
minimisation strategies aimed at allowing a gambler to stay in control of their 
decisions and behaviour during gambling, whilst concurrently limiting the 
negative impact this may have on the gambling experience for those who 
frequently stay in control. The following article evaluates the use of limit 
setting and pre-commitment, the use of ‘cooling off’ periods, and restricting 
access to additional funds as harm minimisation strategies, in terms of their 
efficacy in facilitating self-control in problem and non-problem gambling 
populations. As with any potential mass intervention, such as the use of 
mandatory limit setting, the need for robust empirical evidence to prove its 
efficacy is essential. Existing research, while providing promise, falls short of 
this criterion, indicating a requirement for more stringent empirical research 
to best guide responsible gambling practices aimed at facilitating player 
control during gambling.  
 
Keywords: Electronic Gaming Machines; Harm Minimisation; Pre-
Commitment; Problem Gambling; Responsible Gambling; Self-Control. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Research consistently indicates that gamblers frequently gamble more 
than intended (Blaszczynski, Ladouceur, & Lalande, 2008); where such 
individuals make impulsive decisions that override pre-session intentions 
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pertaining to time and money with which to gamble. It is argued the shift may 
be motivated by the desire to prolong states of dissociation, need for 
emotional escape, desire to prolong excitement, impulsive choosing of short 
term rewards over longer term larger rewards, erroneous gambling beliefs 
such as a win being ‘due’, or the pressure to chase losses (See Petry, 2005 for 
review). These behavioural shifts are seen as reflecting a degree of impaired 
self-control, potentially resulting from a failure to maintain adequate goals or 
standards, a failure to self-monitor behaviour in line with such 
goals/standards, and weakened motivations (Moore, Thomas, Kyrios, & 
Bates, 2012). 
An individual’s capacity to self-regulate can be undermined by a series of 
factors, including: inability to regulate emotions (Scannel et al., 2000; 
Williams et al., 2012) and the use of emotion over problem-focused coping 
strategies (Blaszczynski, McConaghy, & Frankova, 1990); erroneous 
gambling cognitions (see Hodgins & Holub, 2007; Petry, 2005); heightened 
states of arousal (see Abrams & Krushner, 2004; Delfabbro, 2014); and 
neurotransmitter deregulation (Humphreys & Richards, 2014; Gouudriaan, 
van Holst, Veltman, & den Brink, 2014). In recognition of the difficulties 
gamblers have in maintaining self-control during periods of heightened 
arousal or emotion (Sharpe, Tarrier, Schotte, & Spense, 1995; Baudinet & 
Blaszczynski, 2012; William, Grisham, Erskine, & Cassidy, 2012) it is 
essential from a harm minimisation perspective to implement strategies aimed 
at facilitating player control during gambling. 
 
2 LIMIT SETTING  
 
It has been suggested allowing players to set monetary and time limits that 
cannot be exceeded will act to facilitate control over play and, importantly, 
reduce the likelihood of gambling to excess (Productivity Commission, 2010). 
The intent with such an approach is that it imposes external controls on a 
player to prevent gambling beyond levels initially intended, irrespective of the 
strength of any urges to prolong the gambling session. Essentially, the player 
sets limits on time and monetary expenditure prior to the commencement of 
play, which are decided upon when the individual is in the absence of any 
arousal/excitement that might impair decision-making (that is, a state of ‘cold 
emotions’), allowing more rational decisions to be made regarding time and 
monetary expenditure in accord with their budgetary constraints (Scannel, 
1999). The advantage of pre-commitment is that, once a limit is set, factors 
related to emotional states, incurred losses, personality traits (impulsivity and 
risk-taking), and shifting motivations, are less likely to influence decisions, 
making it more likely an individual will adhere to initial intentions and 
decisions. 
Such a strategy is supported by the findings of a number of studies 
exploring methods used by those with a gambling disorder to self-regulate 
their gambling behaviour. Moore, Thomas, Kyrios, and Bates (2012) 
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reviewed the natural recovery literature to elicit the range of useful self-
management techniques used by individuals ceasing their gambling in the 
absence of professional intervention, especially relevant given the fact 40-
82% of individuals with a gambling disorder recover without professional 
help (Abbot, Williams, & Volberg, 1999; Froberg, Rosendahl, Abbot, 
Romlid, Tengstrom, & Hallqvist, 2014; Slutske, 2006). One of the primary 
techniques identified was self-imposed limit setting (Blaszczynski & Nower, 
2010; Nelson et al., 2008; Dzik, 2006), where approaches reportedly used 
included taking set amounts of cash to venues and leaving credit and debit 
cards at home, taking alternative routes home to avoid or by-pass venues, 
involvement in substitute activities/hobbies with greater personal salience, 
and coming to the realisation that gambling impinges negatively on their 
overall quality of life. Building on these studies, Moore and colleagues (2012) 
administered a 20-item self-regulation scale to a sample of social, problem, 
and ex-problem gambling participants. Consistent with existing literature, 
they found a five-factor structure best described the key strategies: limit 
setting (time and money); cognitive approaches (awareness of negative 
outcomes and competing priorities); direct action (help-seeking, destroying 
credit cards, limiting ready access to cash); social experience (not gambling in 
isolation); and avoidance (not attending venues). 
Several jurisdictions, namely Australia, Denmark, New Zealand, Norway, 
Nova Scotia, and Sweden have instigated trials evaluating voluntary or 
mandatory pre-commitment for electronic gaming machines (EGMs; 
Williams, West, & Simpson, 2012), and more recently, Great Britain. In the 
case of Norway, all players must register with a central monitoring server, and 
all machines have a mandatory pre-commitment threshold (Biggs, 2011). 
However, whilst conceptually sound with high face validity and potential 
promise (Griffiths, 2012; Parke, Rigbye, & Parke, 2008; Productivity 
Commission, 2010), there is currently no strong or conclusive empirical 
evidence demonstrating the efficacy of pre-commitment for the majority of 
players or problem gamblers (Ladouceur, Baszczynski, & Lalande, 2012; 
Parke, Rigbye, & Parke, 2008). Despite inherent methodological limitations, 
self-report data shows that the majority of gamblers regard pre-commitment 
as positive and results in a reduction of time and money expenditure, as well 
as loss chasing behaviour (Omnifacts Bristol Research, 2005, 2007; Schottler 
Consulting, 2010). The challenge is to determine the proportion and 
characteristics of those players benefiting from pre-commitment, and to 
devise strategies to maximise the uptake of pre-commitment without causing 
unintended negative consequences. 
It is a matter of concern that pre-commitment might result in the setting of 
high limits for a small proportion of players (Responsible Gambling Council, 
2009) which could potentially lead to an exacerbation of expenditure 
(Ladouceur, Blaszczynski, & Lalande, 2012). For example, higher limits may 
be set to avoid a repeat of situations where a player unexpectedly meets a 
friend at a gambling venue but has already met their limits and thus, cannot 
38 
FACILITATING PLAYER CONTROL IN GAMBLING 
 
 
take part in further social gambling. This highlights the fact that unless 
experimental or observational research is carried out into pre-commitment in 
the exact regulatory and cultural context in which it is intended to be 
introduced, it might not be possible to determine its impact in a cost-effective 
manner. Findings from jurisdictions with socio-political and cultural 
differences may not validly transfer to others. In addition, the principle of 
‘proportionality’ ought to be considered, that is, a great standard of evidence 
is required for interventions that are costly, affect the majority of players, and 
have ramifications for revenue and taxation, before they should be introduced 
into jurisdiction. 
 
2.1 Most Gamblers Pre-commit Expenditure Levels 
 
Most gamblers do indeed predetermine the amount of money or time they 
wish to spend in a session. In a qualitative study, Husain, Wardle, Kenny, 
Balarajan, and Collins (2013) found that individuals tend to set predetermined 
budgets depending on decisions related to how much they are willing to lose, 
and then subsequently play at stake levels that maximise the chance of playing 
for a chosen length of time. This is supported empirically in research by 
Lalande and Ladouceur (2011), who demonstrated that 80% of both 
subgroups of problem and non-problem Video Lottery Terminal (VLT) 
players reported setting expenditure limits prior to play. Similarly, 90% of a 
sample of slot machine players reported setting financial limits prior to 
entering a gaming facility (Wohl, Christie, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010). 
According to anecdotal reports and trails by industry operators however, 
players seem to be more reluctant to set time limits, which was confirmed in 
recent literature reviews by Lalande and Ladouceur (2011), and Williams, 
West, and Simpson (2012). 
Pre-commitment is one matter, but setting limits that fall within one’s 
affordable discretionary disposable income is another. Problem gamblers 
consistently gamble beyond their affordable budget, often risking greater 
amounts as they chase losses (Lesiuer, 1984; McDonnell-Phillips, 2006; 
Lalande & Ladouceur, 2011). Problem gamblers also self-reported to set 
higher subjective expenditure thresholds in comparison to non-problem 
gamblers as found by Lalande and Ladouceur (2011), who also found that 
42% of the problem gamblers exceeded personally set limits compared to 8% 
of the non-problem gambling group. Thus, it may be argued that a pre-
commitment system designed to minimise losses for problem gamblers, but 
require those with impaired control to set their own expenditure levels, is 
fundamentally flawed. Whether or not a pre-commitment system prevents or 
delays the onset of a gambling disorder, and the extent to which it is 
successful in decreasing the incidence of problem gambling, is yet to be 
determined by prospective studies. By definition, individuals with a gambling 
disorder exhibit impaired control over their gambling behaviour as reflected in 
repeated unsuccessful efforts to reduce their gambling and in gambling more 
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than can be afforded in an effort to chase losses. The challenge therefore, is to 
encourage individuals to (a) self-determine appropriate budgets relative to 
their income, and (b) not to increase pre-set limits over time. What is required 
is more objective measures using prospective research designs to allow more 
conclusive statements on the impact of pre-commitment to be made. 
 
2.2 Conducive Gambling Environments to Set Limits 
 
As the Productivity Commission (2010) notes, the labels used to describe 
mandatory, partial, or full voluntary pre-commitment often lead to confusion. 
A fully ‘mandatory’ system is one that requires all players to be registered to 
play. The operator sets default deposit and loss limits, and once the pre-set 
limit is reached, further play is not allowed. Norway is a prime example of 
such a system. 
A ‘partial voluntary’ system refers to one where an operator offers a pre-
commitment facility, but the decision to use this facility is left to the 
discretion of the player. Players can elect to use the pre-commitment facility, 
but once the pre-set limit is reached, are allowed to continue to play. In 
contrast, a ‘full voluntary’ system requires individuals to register to play but 
retain the option of using the pre-commitment option or not. Once the facility 
is used to set a limit and that limit is reached, no further play is permitted. 
 
2.3 Electronic Gaming Machines 
 
Individuals do not readily voluntarily register for and/or use pre-
commitment systems available without having some awareness and 
understanding of their purposes and intent (Blaszczynski, Ladouceur, & 
Lalande, 2012; Williams, West, & Simpson). The take-up rate of pre-
commitment options, particularly given the fact most individuals have already 
done so personally, has been shown to be small, particularly for setting time 
limits. Those who do voluntarily pre-commit said such facilities are useful in 
helping to manage gambling budgets. Accordingly, there is merit in offering 
players the option to use pre-commitment, but the difficulty still remains in 
that those with gambling disorders have difficulty in adhering to decisions 
made pertaining to limit setting, making it important to direct attention to 
certain features of the gambling environment. The extent to which these 
features can be modified, and in what manner, is subject to socio-cultural and 
political demands. In Norway for example, it was possible to legislate the 
removal of all gaming machines and the reintroduction of mandatory low-
intensity pre-commitment machines and registration allowing for player 
tracking, given the population’s propensity to accept mandatory policies as a 
means of balancing societal and personal liberties (Sjolstad, 2008, as cited in 
Responsible Gambling Council, 2009). Any attempt to conduct a similar 
enterprise in more socially liberal socio-cultural contexts, such as the UK, 
USA, or Australia, would most likely be met with strong resistance. 
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2.4 Mandatory versus Voluntary Pre-Commitment  
 
For optimum success, an EGM pre-commitment system needs to apply to 
all players whilst eliminating the options for players to (a) exchange player 
cards with other players, or be provided with temporary cards by venue 
operators once pre-set thresholds are reached, and (b) switch play to cash-
based machines. There would also be a necessity for restrictions on the 
timeframe for increasing limits and opting out of low default limits to 
minimise impulsive decision-making. A mandatory system has the advantage 
of helping both recreational gamblers avoid chasing losses, and assist problem 
gamblers in managing their expenditure. While Norway is an exemplar of this 
approach, the ability for players to switch to other forms of gambling 
undermines the system’s effectiveness, but the extent to which gamblers 
readily substitute one form of gambling to another is yet to be established. 
Indeed, it might be the case that EGM players do not readily switch gambling 
activities, resulting in a reduction of problem gambling. This does however 
highlights the need to monitor the longer-term effects in Norway, particularly 
given suggestions of a possible increased uptake in internet gambling (Biggs, 
2011). 
This potential for transition means that all forms of gambling should be 
subjected to the same pre-commitment requirements. It is acknowledged that 
this would be more difficult for gambling requiring ‘over-the-counter’ cash 
transactions (e.g. casinos, horse wagering) where loyalty cards or registration 
is not required. Setting this issue aside, in more liberal, individualistic 
societies, such mass intervention may not be tolerated by the community at 
large, and therefore, is not a realistically viable option to consider.  
In most other jurisdictions, voluntary pre-commitment facilities are 
offered as options that players can use at their discretion. Voluntary limit 
setting has the advantage of being available to all those wishing to use the 
facility while not imposing limits or additional steps to initiate play imposed 
on recreational gamblers. One primary advantage of a voluntary pre-
commitment system is that it represents an excellent adjunct for a number of 
gamblers in treatment programmes. Therapists can incorporate the use of pre-
commitment facilities in treatment programmes designed to assist individuals 
with a gambling disorder maintain controlled gambling. Ticket-out printed 
player information could be used to obtain evidence of compliance with 
therapeutic instruction, though ideally, data across all sessions and forms of 
gambling should be recorded, but nevertheless, voluntary systems can still 
benefit those motivated to overcome a gambling disorder. In addition, 
recreational gamblers with occasional episodes of gambling more than 
intended may see the option as useful to minimise the chances of exceeding 
their budget, and such voluntary options are not imposed on the majority of 
gamblers who stay in control of their gambling, and therefore avoiding 
negatively impacting on their gambling experience. 
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2.5 Online and Offline Gambling Environments 
 
Pre-commitment facilities can be incorporated in EGMs with land-based 
venues as a standard feature. The cost to the industry of having to modify or 
manufacture pre-commitment compliant machines may be substantial and acts 
as a barrier to its feasible introduction (Parke, Rigbye, & Parke, 2008). Costs 
may also be associated with the purchase of smarts cards that incorporate bio-
identification features used to prevent card swapping behaviour that occurs 
among approximately a third of players (Omnifacts Bristol, 2005; 2007). 
However, the availability of cash-based EGMs or other gambling 
opportunities within the same venue dilutes the potential effectiveness of pre-
commitments if players can easily switch gambling activities once their pre-
set limits are reached.  
Studies using university students in simulated laboratory gambling 
situations have evaluated the effectiveness of limit setting in modifying 
behaviours (Steenbergh, Whelan, Meyers, May, & Floyd, 2004; Stewart & 
Wohl, 2013). Although results have been promising, design limitations of 
most studies makes it difficult to isolate the effects of student-experimenter 
demand characteristics and/or concurrent interventions administered on 
outcomes. In Steenbergh et al.’s (2004) study for example, participants in the 
warning plus brief intervention condition were informed of the benefits and 
then encouraged to set limits, with 100% and 51% complying for money and 
time limits respectively. This is compared with 24% (money) and 9% (time) 
for the control condition, and 35% (money) and 11% (time) for the warning 
video only condition. Direct encouragement was not given for the latter two 
conditions, suggesting the possibility that demand characteristics of the 
study’s design resulted in 100% of participants setting money limits.  
Wohl et al. (2010) exposed non-problem slot machine players to animated 
educational videos explaining probabilities and randomness. Included were 
seven ‘concrete actions’ for ‘problem-free gambling’ that incorporated 
suggestions for setting financial limits in addition to limiting access to 
additional funds, for example, leaving credit cards at home. While fewer 
participants in the animation compared to non-animation group exceeded set 
limits, at 30-day follow-up the difference was not significant. Given the 
multiple ‘problem-free gambling’ strategies that were offered, it makes it 
difficult to attribute findings specifically to limit-setting rather than other 
actions aimed at limiting access to cash.  
Wohl, Gainsbury, Stewart, and Sztainert (2013), exposed university 
students to either an educational or non-educational video; the educational 
video was designed to examine common misconceptions about the operation 
of gambling machines. Participants received a pop-up message that required 
them to set a limit on credits they wished to spend. More participants in the 
educational video compared to control condition adhered to pre-set limits in a 
virtual gambling laboratory environment, but given that the educational video 
group also reported less gambling-related cognitions, it remains unclear 
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whether adherence was the result of setting limits or changes in erroneous 
cognitions. 
More recently, Walker, Litvin, Sobel, and St-Pierre (2014) explored an 
innovative concept of setting win limits as a responsible gambling tool, that is, 
pre-committing to a pre-set winning amount and ceasing play if that limit is 
achieved. The rationale is that players persist in gambling such that even if 
they do win, they will continue play until their loss limit is reached. Walker et 
al. (2014) reported evidence for improved player performance in a simulated 
slot machine software program. The authors acknowledge however, that such 
an approach may not gain acceptance as a responsible gambling tool. Players 
may set unrealistically high win limits and rarely reach these, or continue to 
play beyond their winning threshold if they believed they were on a winning 
‘streak’; subsequent losses resulting in a win below the threshold might lead 
the player to persist in an attempt to reach the win limit, ultimately losing all. 
Reaching a win limit early in a session would reduce that session’s duration, 
which may cause conflict in decisions for those players who intend to gamble 
recreationally for a longer period of time.  
Internet gambling, on the other hand, lends itself well to the application of 
a mandatory pre-commitment system. All players must open an account and 
all gambling, done with that operator, is monitored. At the account opening 
stage, players can set their deposit, daily bet limit, and maximum loss 
thresholds. Personalised warning messages can be directed electronically to 
player approaching or reaching their pre-set limits, and accounts can be 
suspended for high-risk players who repeatedly reach or increase their 
threshold limits.  
A number of agencies have developed behavioural tracking programs (e.g. 
Mentor, Bet Buddy, Featurespace, Playscan) that provide feedback to players 
regarding their gambling behaviour patterns relative to normative data. 
Preliminary evidence indicates a benefit for those electing to use these 
programs (Auer & Griffiths, 2013), however, the possibility of transferring to 
other online or offline venues once thresholds have been reached dilutes the 
overall effectiveness of such software programs. For example, Parke et al. 
(2012) found that the vast majority of internet gamblers had played more than 
one gambling website in the three months preceding the survey, with 25% and 
12% on internet casino and poker player respectively reporting having played 
with at least six different operators in the same time frame. Findings from the 
Internet Poker Committee (2008; cited in Responsible Gambling Council, 
2009) indicate that over a third of 1,000 internet players on Svenka Spel’s 
sites shifted to another online site when set limits were reached. 
The capacity for players to ignore or set excessively high limits negates 
the purpose of pre-commitment. Broda et al. (2008) found only 0.3% of 
account holders exceed deposit limits, arguably because operators set minimal 
deposit limits that are higher than the average amount that players deposit 
which may account for this low percentage figure. Importantly, players 
informed that their betting limits were exceeded changed their betting patterns 
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such that there was a reduction in the number of bets placed but a 
compensatory increase in single large bets. 
 
2.6 Stimulating the Take-up of Pre-Commitment  
 
Reviews of the outcome of studies conducted in Nova Scotia, and the 
Australian states of Queensland and South Australia (see Productivity 
Commission, 2010; Responsible Gambling Council, 2009; Williams, West, & 
Simpson, 2012), have clearly indicated that players are not highly motivated 
to take up pre-commitment facilities, particularly in regards to setting time 
limits. Despite gamblers reporting that they agree pre-commitment represents 
a useful tool to facilitate player control, behaviourally only a fraction of 
individuals (Ladouceur, Blaszczynski, & Lalande, 2012; Williams, West, & 
Simpson, 2012) actually decide to use pre-commitment options when 
gambling. 
This low usage rate likely reflects a poor understanding of the concept 
and/or lack of motivation to use the system. If pre-commitment is to be 
successful, it is argued that the facility should be normalised and players fully 
educated. An appropriate education campaign should be introduced, 
marketing pre-commitment as a normalised budget management system, 
designed to inform players that the primary purpose of pre-commitment is to 
offer a general tool to maintain recreational gambling at affordable levels and 
to minimise impulsive decision-making under conditions of emotional 
arousal/distress that drives individuals to gamble more than intended and/or 
affordable.  
 
3 COOLING-OFF 
 
The premise underlying cooling-off periods is that individuals, because of 
deficits in emotional regulation, operant condition, or financial pressure to 
chase losses, may impulsively decide to continue play (Delfabbro, 2014; 
Lesieur, 1984; Williams, Grisham, Erskine, & Cassidy, 2012), or increase pre-
set limits to extend current or future sessions of play. Cooling-off periods are 
important in offering gamblers time to reconsider and re-evaluate their 
decisions to gamble, particularly decisions made impulsively and without 
consideration of their consequences. Cooling-off periods are common in 
commercial transactions where contracts allow individuals a timeframe in 
which they can rescind purchases without penalty.  
Online providers and venues providing pre-commitment options on EGMs 
require a period of delay before an individual can access gambling funds 
following a request to increase deposit or bet limits. Typically reductions in 
deposit limits take effect immediately, while increases do not take effect for 
variable periods; 24, 48, 72 hours, or up to one week. There is a lack of 
empirical evidence to indicate that cooling-off periods assist problem 
gamblers to limit losses to affordable levels, how many gamblers rescind their 
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request for an increase after the imposed delay, or decide to return to pre-
request levels of expenditure. While this does not diminish the usefulness of 
cooling-off periods, it does argue the need for more data on the degree of its 
effectiveness and guidelines for enhancing its impact. 
It has been argued that delays in play can be achieved by limiting the 
operating hours of venues on the assumption that individuals will be better 
placed to limit losses if there is a reduction in time available to gamble. A 
number of jurisdictions have required venues to operate restricted hours of 
trade, for example, Nova Scotia, Australia, and Switzerland. These closures 
may involve shutting down gambling facilities in venues for four to six hours 
daily, or after midnight/early morning until midday/early afternoon (for 
example see Williams, West, & Simpson, 2012). 
Gauging changes in revenue as a proxy index of successful harm 
minimisation initiatives indicates closing times effectively reduce venue 
revenue by 3-10% and 18% in self-reported expenditure. However, as noted 
by McMillen and Pitt (2005), closing periods do not have a major impact on 
reducing problem gambling, arguably due to the fact that problem gamblers 
do not gamble during the shutdown, or that they simply move from venue to 
venue due to a lack of universal shutdown period across venues. This is 
supported by Parr (2008) who found 63% of problem gamblers continued to 
gamble during closure of a venue. There remains a lack of substantive 
evidence to indicate the effectiveness of trading hour restriction as a cooling-
off period and harm minimisation strategy for problem gambling.  
Gamblers often enter into states of dissociation (Jacobs, 1986) and lose 
track of time and money spent whilst gambling. Theoretically therefore, 
forcing a break in play by causing a machine to cease functioning or having a 
mandatory cash out feature after a period of continuous use, or interrupting 
dissociation through dynamic messages displayed on screen, provides an 
opportunity for re-evaluation of one’s behaviour. 
A number of studies have evaluated the effects of dynamic and 
personalised messages on gaming machines (e.g. Monagahan & Blaszczynski, 
2010), and while promise is shown in terms of short-term self-reported 
benefits, its overall effectiveness in changing actual behaviour remains 
inconclusive. Nevertheless, personalised dynamic messages directed at 
players who engage in long periods of play have the advantage of not 
interfering with recreational gamblers, but target those for whom the message 
is most relevant (Monagahan & Blaszczynski, 2010). More importantly, 
dynamic messages are designed to gain the attention of the player and to 
motivate them to re-evaluate their behaviour. Other types of breaks in play 
simply assume that the individual will take the opportunity and/or be 
motivated to do so. 
While forcing breaks in play has high face validity in allowing a player to 
re-evaluate their behaviour, recent literature pertaining to the App-based game 
‘Candy Crush’ suggests much of the ‘addictiveness’ of the game can be 
attributed to the imposed breaks in play (Dockterman, 2013). The extent to 
45 
THE JOURNAL OF GAMBLING BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 
2014, 8 3 
 
which a break in play can create a sense of frustration and stimulate demand 
has particular relevance to gambling. It may be the case that imposing breaks 
upon gamblers may inadvertently cause compensatory behaviours, such as 
gambling larger amounts in a shorter period of time in anticipation of the 
onset of a break. The implication is that such strategies designed to introduce 
breaks in play may be counterproductive if they withdraw supply and the urge 
to gamble remains unsatisfied, highlighting the need for such concepts to be 
tested carefully.  
It is evident that more clarity is needed to determine the optimal frequency 
and length of breaks in play in terms of their effect on gambling behaviour. 
For example, imposing frequent short breaks in play may have different 
effects on behaviour compared with infrequent long breaks, where frequent 
short breaks may be perceive as irritating, but infrequent long breaks may 
have the ability to disrupt dissociative states and encourage re-appraisal of 
behaviour. Clearly, in situations where a gambler has played continuously 
over a period of ten or more hours, the session should be interrupted, as such 
behaviour is indicative of a gambling disorder (Schull, 2013). Staff 
intervention to break play in such circumstances is warranted, however, the 
nature of this type of break in play (staff intervening after prolonged play) 
differs from the imposition of breaks during the course of sessions of much 
shorter duration. 
 
4 ACCESS TO ADDITIONAL FUNDS 
 
Problem gamblers often seek to obtain additional funds to continue 
gambling once their initial budget allocation for a session has been exhausted, 
leading them to spend more than intended (Ladouceur, Blaszczynski, & 
Moodie, 2008). To facilitate player control, efforts have been directed to 
restricting options to withdraw more funds. In many jurisdictions, venue 
operators are not permitted to offer lines of credit or to advance cash against 
cheques, though exceptions occur in the USA and some Canadian provinces. 
In Australia, winnings exceeding $1000 are paid by cheque, a requirement 
that gamblers report can be effective in limiting the likelihood of excessive 
spending (Caraniche, 2005; McMillen & Pitt, 2005). Problem gamblers have a 
greater tendency to borrow money in comparison to non-problem gamblers, 
with 25-75% of problem gamblers reporting using credit and borrowing to 
supplement their gambling (McMillen, Tremayne, & Masterman-Smith, 2001; 
South Australian Department for Families and Communities, 2007). 
Automatic teller machines (ATMs) located in venues provide ample 
opportunity for individuals to easily withdraw additional funds. Self-report 
data from gamblers suggests that 24-hour easy access to ATMs in venues 
represents a trigger for impulsive decision making (White et al., 2006). 
Problem compared to recreational gamblers are more likely to withdraw 
money from ATMs (59-87% versus 4-20% respectively), withdraw larger 
amounts of cash (30% of problem gamblers in excess of $100), direct their 
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withdrawal to fund continued gambling, with the majority of problem 
gamblers making multiple withdrawals (76-92% compared to 54% of 
moderate risk and 18-25% of recreational gamblers) (McMillen, Marshall, & 
Murphy, 2004; Productivity Commission, 1999). 
In 2009, the Victorian Gambling Regulation Amendment (Licensing Act) 
effectively legislated for the removal of ATMs from all licensed gaming 
venues, with the exception of casinos, commencing July 2012, with its impact 
reviewed a year later. Results indicated the initiative appeared successful in 
the short term, reducing time and money expenditure among moderate and 
problem gamblers, such that these individuals reported a greater sense of 
control and fewer occasions of spending more than intended; a reduction from 
44% to 26% pre-to post-removal of ATMs (Thomas, et al., 2013). 
Self-report data suggests however, that some patrons migrated to other 
venues in close proximity to ATMs or participated in other forms of gambling 
(McMillen & Pitt, 2005). Thus, if a policy of ATM removal is to be 
instigated, it should be extended to apply to all venues in close proximity, 
although this does not address the availability of ATMs in local public 
locations. In addition, it should be applied to other venue-based options for 
accessing cash, such as ‘over-the-counter’ debit card withdrawals to load 
machines. 
It remains to be seen if individuals will modify their behaviour in the long 
term to compensate for the absence of ATMs in venues. Nevertheless, in the 
absence of ATMs, individuals will be required to make considered pre-
planned decisions as to how much they intend to spend gambling, that is, 
decisions equivalent to the concept of pre-commitment. Moreover, individuals 
seeking to obtain additional funds would be required to leave the venue to 
access an ATM which could act as a break in play (Productivity Commission, 
2010). Although increasing the opportunity for staff interactions with players, 
the use of debit cards to load machines in a manner described by the 
Association of British Bookmakers (2013) in their code of responsible 
gambling and player protection, will serve to undermine the intent of any 
strategy designed to limit access to cash, and therefore should not be 
supported. The use of debit cards may act to distance the relationship between 
money and the act of gambling, and enhance the prospect of an individual 
failing to realise exactly how much they have spent gambling over multiple 
used of debit cards within a session, or indeed longer term. The question 
remains whether the opportunity to use debit cards and hence easy access to 
cash is contrary to the notion of fostering a responsible gambling 
environment.  
 
5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
Policies designed to facilitate player control should focus on strategies 
that effectively assist players experiencing impaired control to (a) set limits on 
the time and money expenditure within a session of play, and (b) restrict their 
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ability to withdraw additional funds to continue play. Higher standards of 
evidence is required before implementing costly interventions affecting the 
majority of players and revenue and taxation. Accordingly, and given the 
current state of knowledge and complexities of a gambling environment such 
as in Great Britain, the mandatory requirement for all gaming machines and 
regulated online gambling accounts to have pre-commitment facilities 
offering players the option to voluntary set limits on time and money 
expenditure should be introduced. This would allow those with problems 
controlling their expenditure to limit losses, as well as provide opportunity for 
recreational gamblers to manage their gambling budget. At the same time, 
such a system would avoid the inconvenience of and concerns imposed by a 
mandatory system, such as privacy and the tracking of gambling-related 
expenditure by third parties.  
The option to limit access to cash might involve a range of strategies from 
removing ATMs from venues, to restricting daily withdrawals to certain 
amounts, removing capacities to use or placing limits on the usage and 
amounts able to be deposited in debit cards, and players self-barring use of 
debit cards within venues. In the context of a libertarian society such as the 
UK, a voluntary pre-commitment system allowing the option for motivated 
players to use its facilities while concomitantly restricting easy access to cash 
through ATMs and debit card loading of machines, and providing historical 
information on their expenditure, appears to be an acceptable compromise in 
light of the current available empirical research data.  
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